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Throughout his later philosophy, Wittgenstein repeatedly 
asks the following: ”What makes my image of him into an  im- 
age of him?” (LW1 308).’ “What makes this  picture his pic- 
ture?” (LW1 309). He takes this same question to apply to 
linguistic utterances: “Isn’t my question like this: ‘What makes 
this sentence a sentence that has to do with him?’” (LW1 308). 
This is by no means a peripheral concern of Wittgenstein’s, 
and in  Philosophical Grammar (62), where he first phrases 
this question, he pronounces: “That’s him (this picture repre- 
sents h i m b t h a t  contains the whole problem of representa- 
tion.” 
This essay will explore Wittgenstein’s evolving interest in  
this key problem of representation, his criticisms of certain 
tempting answers, and his own perspicuous solution.2 So as to 
bring some cohesion to this highly ramified issue, I will mostly 
restrict my discussion to mental images along with diagrams, 
maps, models, sketches, paintings, and so on, which I will 
lump together as “p ic t~res .”~  Loosely, what sets apart pictures, 
when they are used to depict how something is, is tha t  they 
are correct when they resemble (look like, are projectable onto) 
what they are meant to r e p r e ~ e n t . ~  The later Wittgenstein as- 
sumes tha t  a picture may be of a n  actual or possible, real or 
fictitious, particular or type of thing or situation: for example, 
Napoleon, Napoleon’s coronation, a kind of action, or people in 
a village inn (cf., PG 114). In order to resolve a n  ambiguity in 
talk of what a picture “represents” or is “about” or “of,” I will 
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call the “target” what it is supposed to  be of, the “content” how 
it  represents this target as  being (when it is used to  depict 
how something is), and I will speak of what it resembles as a 
structured complex as  what it “ s ~ o w s . ” ~  Thus a map, whose 
target is the street plan of Manhattan, may show a grid of 
streets, and in part have the content of representing that Fifth 
Avenue runs along Central Park’s east  side. Provided this 
rough distinction, I will clarify Wittgenstein’s question in this 
direction: What makes a picture of a target? 
I. 
I will suggest tha t  Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was barred 
from asking, in particular, what makes a picture of him or 
represent that he is short or bald. This work was nonetheless 
deeply concerned to  express both what comprises and what 
grounds a picture’s target and content, and in such a way as 
to  lay bare how a picture correctly or incorrectly represents 
how things stand. These same concerns carry over into his 
later thought even if, as  I will soon examine, his accounts of 
each alter. 
“We picture facts t o  ourselves” (2 .1) ,  according t o  the 
Tractatus, and a fact “is the existence of states of affairs” (2). 
This is possible because a picture is a model of reality (2.12): it 
“presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non- 
existence of states of affairs” (2.11). This means, t o  speak 
loosely for now, that a picture has “reality” as its target. “It is 
laid against reality like a measure” (2.1512), so that  the pic- 
ture is “true” o r  “false” on the basis of whether i t  agrees or  
disagrees with reality (2.21-2.225). This also means that a pic- 
ture must have a “sense,” roughly what I term a “content,” 
which comprises how things are depicted as standing in real- 
ity (2.221). Now a picture cannot function t o  model anything 
unless it can be either true or false, and it cannot be either 
unless it has a sense “independently of its t ruth or falsity” 
(2.22). Because its target is reality, a picture must therefore 
have a sense apart from how things do stand in reality (cf., 
2.173). Yet, one cannot judge whether a picture is true or false 
by comparing it with reality unless its sense at once reveals 
which conditions make it true or false. Thus, a picture’s sense 
is “a possible situation in logical space” (2.2221, and because 
the picture represents that  this possible situation exists or  
does not exist, its sense is therefore how things stand in real- 
ity if it is true (cf., 4.022). 
So what makes a picture have a particular sense? The an- 
swer is tha t  a picture’s sense is something it internally 
“shows.” “A picture contains the possibility of the situation 
that it represents” (2.2031, so that one sees this possible situa- 
tion in the picture itself (cf., 4.023). For the situation that is 
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the case if the picture is true consists in a determinate set of 
simple objects of reality (2.01), whose definite relations to each 
other are its “structure” (2.032), and where the “possibility of 
this  s t ructure” is its Kform” (2.033). Likewise, as a “fact” 
(2.141), a picture is also a structure of elements (2.14, 2.151, 
where “the possibility of this structure” constitutes its “picto- 
rial form” (2.15). Now, individually or as a heap, a picture’s el- 
ements have no sense but merely stand in for objects as their 
“representatives” (2.13-2.131). I t  is nonetheless the “pictorial 
relationship” the picture “includes,” wherein the (simple) ele- 
ments of the picture correlate to simple objects of reali ty 
(2.1514), that enables the picture to contain the possibility of a 
fixed set of simple objects against whose actual structure the 
picture is measured. Unfortunately, the lZactatus does not say 
how the two are correlated. Is it that  an element is arbitrarily 
assigned to an object to which one attends? Or is it that  an  el- 
ement correlates to just the object whose combinatorial possi- 
bilities in situations (the object’s “form,” 2.0141) mirrors i ts  
combinatorial possibilities in pictures (the element’s “form?”)? 
Though I will not make too much of it, I lean toward the sec- 
ond interpretation since it strikes me that a picture could not 
show its sense unless (from within a system of pictures) i t  
could show which things it depicts as standing a certain way.6 
In any event, what enables the picture to contain the possibil- 
ity of a precise structure of the objects correlating to its ele- 
ments, apart from their actual structure, is its pictorial form. 
For besides being the possibility of the picture’s structure, 
“[plictorial form is the possibility tha t  things are  related to 
one another in  the same way as the elements of the picture” 
(2.151). A picture’s sense is therefore determined by to which 
possible structure of simple objects the picture is isomorphic 
when its elements are correlated to these objects. 
To speak more precisely now, on the Tractatus, a picture’s 
target is how the simple objects of reality corresponding to its 
elements are in fact arranged, while its content is how these 
objects are arranged i f  the picture is true. Thus, for example, 
a picture is never of a particular chair and never represents 
t h a t  i t  is black or leather. For one thing, whatever the  
Tractatus’ “simple objects” are, a particular chair is presum- 
ably entirely a structure of simple objects. For another, a 
picture’s target is the actual arrangement, not of this chair’s 
simples, but of the simple objects of reality correlating to the 
picture’s elements. I t  is th i s  t h a t  the  picture is measured 
against, and because it is correct if and only if its structure is 
of identical form to the actual structure of these objects, i ts  
t ruth or falsity is indifferent to whether these simple objects 
compose an actual chair, or one arranged in a particular way. 
Why does Wittgenstein later suppose that a picture’s target 
may comprise him, where its content comprises how i t  repre- 
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sents that  he is? This change in perspective grew out of an  in- 
creasing dissatisfaction with the  Tractatus’ vision of t he  
ground of a picture’s target and content, to which I will now 
turn. 
11. 
Starting with unease over the Pactatus’ idea that the truth 
of one elementary proposition cannot depend on the t ruth of 
another (5.1341, prompted by the realization, for example, that  
the t ruth of ‘x is red’ excludes the t ruth of ‘x is green,’ by the 
mid-thirties Wittgenstein had given up several key doctrines 
of the Tractatus infusing and supporting its vision of what 
comprises and grounds a picture’s content and target. On the 
one hand, he abandoned its “metaphysical atomism.” Things 
are simple or complex, he eventually holds, not absolutely but 
only relative to practices wherein we divide things into their 
elements (PI 47).7 Consider a schematic drawing of a cube, A, 
and a wooden cube, B. One might construe B’s simples as six 
flat surfaces or twelve edges, as eight one-square-foot cubes or 
two four-square-foot volumes, or as its molecules or atoms. 
But if B’s structure is a function of both its elements and their 
arrangement, then B will consist in different structures on dif- 
ferent “methods of analysis” (my term). The same goes for A. 
On the other hand, Wittgenstein gave up the idea tha t  any- 
thing has an  “absolute form.” In the Tractatus, the “identical 
form” of A and B was thought to “enable” the projection of A 
onto B (TLP 2.16-2.17), so that A is projectable onto B because 
they share  the  same form. By his Philosophical Grammar 
(113) Wittgenstein had reversed the order of explanation: A 
and B may be said to share the same form just  because A is 
projectable onto B. With what A shares the same form depends 
on how one projects from A, and different “methods of projec- 
tion” are  possible. By utilizing different methods one could 
project A, as a structure of lines, now onto a cube, now onto a 
two-dimensional photograph of a cube, and now onto a pyra- 
mid (cf., PG pp. 212-4; PI 139). 
Now this does not mean tha t  Wittgenstein drops as inco- 
herent talk of what a picture “shows.” The above implies just  
tha t  the complexes A and B are  or a re  not isomorphic only 
given methods of analysis and projection, and tha t  neither 
complex determines which methods ought to be used. Still, he 
also comes to argue tha t  neither can another representation 
determine how one ought to project from or analyze a complex 
(PI 139-141, 198, 201). Certainly, for example, one may pro- 
duce a schema C representing a method of projectingA onto B, 
say by means of drawing A and B together with lines of projec- 
tion running between their elements. But C cannot determine 
how one ought to project A onto B, for different analyses and 
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projections of C are possible, and C itself cannot show how C 
ought to be analyzed or projected. The same holds true for any 
other schema meant to show how C ought to be interpreted 
and applied. Yet, it does not follow that there is no truth about 
whether A is isomorphic to B. We may indeed speak of a “rule” 
of correct projection. Wittgenstein’s point is tha t  this rule’s 
representation does not fix but expresses what constitutes a 
correct projection of A onto B. The criterion for whether one 
correctly interprets and applies the represented rule is simply 
whether one projects A onto B conformably to a particular cus- 
tom or regular use. And we can proceed to correctly project A 
onto B and thereby judge tha t  they are  isomorphic, without 
need of interpreting any represented rule, insofar as we have 
been trained by example into techniques of going on with pic- 
tures (RPP2 400-16). These techniques are the outgrowth of 
our physiology and environment, of our primitive behaviors 
and needs, and of our more evolved social customs and institu- 
tions. In brief, it is these practices that allow for agreement on 
the criteria for whether A really resembles B independent of 
what someone at some point might think (cf., PI 241h8 
All this  does imply, however, tha t  Wittgenstein could no 
longer affirm the IFactatus’ doctrine of pictorial form wherein 
a picture is held to contain the possibility of one determinate 
structure of simple objects by virtue of being one determinate 
structure of pictorial elements. For not only is it possible to 
analyze a picture into different structures of elements, even 
given just  one such analysis it is also possible to project i t  
onto different types of articulated complexes. All this implies 
as well that  Wittgenstein had to give up the doctrine of picto- 
rial relationship whereby a picture contains the possibility of 
an  exact set of simple objects by virtue of consisting in an  ex- 
act set  of pictorial elements. For he could no longer suppose 
that  pictures and the possible situations they picture decom- 
pose into absolute simples and simples of determinate combi- 
natorial possibilities. But if no picture by itself contains the 
possibility of e i ther  a n  unique se t  of simple objects or a n  
uniquely determinate way in which they are structured, then 
in itself no picture can show just  this and not that “possible 
situation in logical space.- 
How, then, may a picture have a content? What a picture 
shows as a n  arrangement of elements remains par t  of the  
equation for the later Wittgenstein (cf., PG 121; PI 523). Of 
course, a picture can show something only relative to methods 
of analysis and projection (cf., PG pp. 212-4), and only by vir- 
tue of a viewer’s “recognizing in it objects in some sort of char- 
acteristic arrangement” (PG 115, cf., PG 37; PI 526). In the 
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last regard, while it may be capable of showing something that 
a viewer may fail to recognize, what a picture does show de- 
pends on the viewer’s conceptual repertoire (LW1 734). In or- 
der to see a duck in a figure one needs to know what a duck is 
and what it looks like (RPP1 872); and in order to see a run- 
ning horse in a painting one needs to know that horses do not 
just stand in that position (RPP1 873). 
Still, a picture’s content cannot be strictly a function of 
what it shows. We have seen tha t  a picture can show far too 
many things. In addition, a picture’s showing a possible com- 
plex (say, a brick house) is not the same as i ts  representing a 
fact (say, tha t  a certain house is brick) (cf., PG 114). 
Wittgenstein cautions against thinking that a picture can rep- 
resent a fact only when it is translated into words or other pic- 
tures (PG 37, 114, 123). Yet, he also denies that  a picture can 
represent a fact simply by virtue of showing something (PG 
pp. 199-201). One house may after all resemble another, but 
t ha t  does not make it a representation of the fact t ha t  the  
other is a house or is a house of a certain design.1° 
On Wittgenstein’s view, i t  is how one uses a picture, the 
type of action one performs with it, that  makes it represent a 
fact. I t  need not be so used, and he now emphasizes the di- 
verse ways a picture may function: as a portrait,  historical 
painting, genre-painting, landscape, map, diagram, or blue- 
print (cf., PG 114). Further, he now stresses that the same pic- 
tu re  could have now this  use, now that ,  so tha t  it is only a 
picture-token that represents a fact: “Imagine a picture repre- 
senting a boxer in a particular stance. Now, this picture can be 
used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself; 
or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular man 
did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on” (PI p. 11, bot- 
tom). 
In turn, Wittgenstein comes to see that it is the target that 
allows a picture-token to have a discriminate content despite 
the promiscuity of what it shows as a type of structured com- 
plex. As he now views things, the target is a function, not of to 
which simple objects the elements of a picture-type correlate, 
but of that  to which a picture-token is applied, on a variety of 
its uses. I shall later explore Wittgenstein’s conception of this 
“application” and why he ties it to someone’s intention. Here I 
need stress that  it enables him to realize tha t  a picture-type 
does not need to possess a content. Rather, only a picture- 
token has  a content, which i t  has  in virtue of both what it 
shows and  to which target it is applied, so tha t  its content 
comprises how this target is if the picture is accurate. Depend- 
ing on to which target it is applied, therefore, the same round- 
shaped figure may represent now the fact that  a certain coin’s 
face is circular in shape, or now the fact that  someone’s head 
is spherical rather than ovoid. This at once provides a basis on 
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which to discriminate what a picture-token is supposed to 
show from all tha t  a picture-type can show. The fact tha t  a 
picture is a map, and one of New York City’s streets, for ex- 
ample, constrains, from within practices of map-reading, how 
one ought to interpret its lines and colors and project from 
them.” 
All this often surfaces in Wittgenstein’s comparison of pic- 
tures to yardsticks. In his transitional Philosophical Remarks 
he writes: “You cannot compare a picture with reality, unless 
you can set it against it as a yardstick” (43). “It only makes 
sense to give the length of a n  object if I have a method for 
finding the object-since otherwise I cannot apply a yardstick 
to it” (36). Notice that it makes no sense to say that of itself a 
yardstick shows what  is the  case in  reali ty if it is t rue.  
Within a practice of its use, a yardstick constitutes a “method 
of measurement” (PG 84). Yet, it cannot provide a n  actual 
measurement of length unless it is used to measure something 
and is laid against a particular object. I t  is this actual mea- 
surement (the representation of a fact), not the yardstick itself 
(as a complex), t h a t  is  accurate depending on whether it 
agrees with the object’s length (cf., PG 85). This analogy, then, 
suggests that  it is equally senseless to say that a picture by it- 
self shows what is the case in reality if it is true. The picture 
provides a “method of measurement” by virtue of what  it 
shows; and Wittgenstein compares a picture, taken apart from 
any particular use or any particular application to a target, to 
a “proposition-radical” (PI p. 11 bottom). But it may produce 
an  “actual measurement” only insofar as it is applied of a par- 
ticular target. And it is accurate depending on whether what it 
represents this target as being agrees with what this target is. 
This way of thinking of pictorial representation may be fur- 
ther elucidated by briefly considering how Wittgenstein later 
conceives of the logic of linguistic representation. For there 
turn out to be striking parallels between the two, even though 
he has abandoned the idea that a proposition is a kind of pic- 
ture whose sense is grounded in the manner the Ductatus had 
envisaged for pictures. 
Intertwined with Wittgenstein’s discussion of what makes a 
picture of a target is the question of what makes a sentence- 
token of a target such as him (e.g., LW1 308-18; PI 660-693). 
But this ought not be confused with the question of what con- 
nects a sign-type to a “bearer” or “reference.” Nor should the 
question of what makes a particular utterance of “he is com- 
ing” an  assertion, or the expression of an  expectation or wish, 
whose content is that the particular person N is coming (cf., PI 
441-4), be mistaken for the question of how this proposition- 
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type has a sense. To explain, say, of which person someone is 
speaking, or to  explain what it is that someone is asserting, is 
to describe the application of language, and Wittgenstein is 
careful to mark this off from the explanation of the meaning of 
our words. 
According to Philosophical Grammar (45)’ the meaning of a 
sign is part of the “grammar of language.” Only here does a 
word function as a certain sort of tool. When a word is used as 
a “name,” the grammar sets out where in the language this 
sign “is stationed”-establishing, for example, what sort of 
thing gets christened by a name through an ostensive defini- 
tion (PG 45)-and the link of name to  bearer belongs to the 
grammar (PG 55-6). Thus only in the grammar does a proposi- 
tion have a sense: “That an empirical proposition is true and 
another false is not part of the grammar. What belongs to the 
grammar are  all the conditions (the method) necessary for 
comparing the proposition with reality. That is, all the condi- 
tions necessary for understanding (of the sense)” (PG 45). But, 
importantly, none of this is to speak of the “application” of lan- 
guage (PG 451, and a location in a system of grammar does not 
lend a word or proposition an application but makes it a par- 
ticular “method of measurement.” As Wittgenstein writes: “The 
role of a sentence in the calculus is i ts  sense. A method of 
measurement-of length, for example-has exactly the same 
relation to  the correctness of a statement of length as the 
sense of a sentence has  t o  its t ru th  or falsehood“ (PG 84). 
Thus, the explanation of the meaning of a sign through a ver- 
bal or ostensive definition “remains a t  the level of generality 
preparatory to  any application” (PG 45). 
During the thirties, Wittgenstein increasingly refers to 
“language-games” in place of “grammar.” I share the belief 
that  this flags a shift from seeing a sign’s use or meaning as  
fixed by its place in an all-purpose, rule-based, calculus to  see- 
ing it a s  tied to  particular actions themselves inhering in 
certain human and social practices. As a consequence, 
Wittgenstein no longer thinks the explanation of a sign’s 
meaning can prepare one to apply it in any context or as part 
of any action. Yet, “language-games” play a similar role to “the 
grammar”: they make a sign a type of tool, or give it a type of 
meaning, but do not lend it an application (cf., RPPl 240; PI 
241). To explain the meaning of signs is still to “describe meth- 
ods of measurement” rather than to  “obtain and state results 
of measurement”-even if, as he now stresses, “what we call 
‘measuring’ is partly determined by a certain constancy in re- 
sults of measurement” (PI 242). 
Now, if the use or  meaning of types of signs in our lan- 
guage-games constitute types of methods of measurement, 
then, from this later perspective of Wittgenstein’s, particular 
results of measurement cannot be obtained and stated unless 
296 
Representation and Intention 
these signs are  applied to particular objects at certain times 
and in certain contexts-and if they are  applied to other ob- 
jects, different results will ensue. And to describe which object 
is measured in some time and context, or which result of mea- 
surement is obtained and stated, is to explain, respectively, 
what comprises the target and content of a particular applica- 
tion of a sentence. 
Provided this schema, let us  focus on what makes a par- 
ticular utterance of a sentence of a target. A sentence often 
contains a subject expression, whether a demonstrative, 
proper name, plural noun, definite or indefinite description, 
which “designates,” let us say, the object to which its predicate 
expressions are applied. As Wittgenstein remarks: 
If I point to a circle and say ‘That is a circle’ then someone can ob- 
ject that if it were not a circle it would no longer be that. That is 
to say, what I mean by the word ‘that’ must be independent of 
what I assert about it. (PG p. 206) 
It is Wittgenstein’s view that  the object designated by such a 
subject expression is the one the  speaker intends or means 
(meinen), and that  it is the application the speaker makes of 
this expression, and not only the grammar of language, that  
establishes a connection to this  object (cf., PG 62; Z 24; PI 
686-9). This does not mean tha t  the object designated is not 
often the object tha t  is the bearer of a sign. Nor, as we will 
see, does this mean tha t  a speaker could designate a n  object 
without participating in  diverse language-games. What i t  
means is tha t  the target of the sentence “he is coming,” the 
person designated by “he,” hinges on who utters  it. For, as 
Wittgenstein observes, unlike the explanation of a sign-type’s 
sense or reference, the  explanation of which object someone 
means to be speaking of makes appeal to the speaker’s circum- 
stances, together with what this person believes, thinks and 
does (RPPZ 254; cf., Z 9). He notes that certain words may be 
about him because they are used to express the thought of him 
(PG 62): it is their belonging to a language plus this context 
that  makes them of him (LW1 113; PI p. 217; RPPl  230). Or, 
as he remarks while discussing that a conversation is of him: 
“In saying this you refer to the time of speaking. It makes a 
difference whether you refer to this time or that  (The expla- 
nation of a word does not refer to a point of time.)” (LW1 111; 
cf., PI p. 217).12 
This is fairly obvious in the case of demonstratives. The 
later Wittgenstein denies that demonstratives are “names” or 
“proper names” (PI 38-9).0ne upshot of this is that  a demon- 
strative should not be viewed as having a bearer in  the lan- 
guage. I t  is best to see a demonstrative as a multiple-use tool, 
one of whose uses in sentences i s  to designate the subject. 
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Here, which object is  designated depends not simply on the 
character of the demonstrative but also on the time and context 
of its utterance. 
But  what  about subject expressions containing proper 
names? Wittgenstein offers tha t  the link of the thought tha t  
Napoleon was crowned in the year 1805 to Napoleon is due to 
two factors: “that the word ‘Napoleon’ occurs in the expression 
of my thought,  plus the  connection t h a t  word had with i t s  
bearer” (PG 62). He adds that the latter connection need not be 
established at the time one expresses this thought and that  it 
may result from the fact that  “that was the way he signed his 
name, that  was how he was spoken to and so on” (PG 62). Still, 
the link of the thought’s expression to Napoleon is not the same 
as this link of name to bearer; for this same name may after all 
have different bearers in the language, and thus the language 
itself cannot fix which is meant  (cf., Z 7; PI 689). Nor is a 
sentence’s target necessarily the bearer of any of its proper 
names. When one is asked “Who was married to Marie 
Antoinette?” and one wrongly answers, ”Napoleon,” the target 
of the answer is Louis XVI, not Napoleon. 
One may, of course, provide a definite description in clarify- 
ing whom one meant to designate with a proper name (PG 62; 
BB p. 39). Or, as Wittgenstein observes, one may define 
“Moses” via various definite descriptions, so that  a proposition 
containing “Moses” will have different “senses” depending on 
which description is assumed (PI 79). But one need not give up 
one’s proposition as false if one learns that Moses does not sat- 
isfy a n  assumed description; for one may be prepared to fall 
back on other descriptions, or, if they prove false, on yet others 
still. Of course, one could use a proper name as if it were a 
definite description and use it to designate whatever satisfies 
the description (cf., PI 87). Given this use, the language may 
settle what one designates. But when one uses a proper name 
to designate the object of which one believes some of a loose set 
of definite descriptions to hold true, which object one means 
also hinges on what  one believes of th i s  object. And if one 
falsely believes that a regular at the local golf course is the ex- 
president Gerald Ford, whom one designates by “the ex-presi- 
dent Gerald Ford” in  the sentence “The ex-president Gerald 
Ford has on new loafers” might not be the person who satisfies 
this description. 
V. 
Commenting on its view that we “picture facts to ourselves” 
(TLP 2.1) and that pictures model reality by virtue of pictorial 
form and pictorial relationship, the Tractatus states: “That is 
how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right up to it” 
(TLP 2.1511). If Wittgenstein later rejects this vision of how 
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representations connect to reality, he by no means loses inter- 
est in how they do so. His interlocutor phrases the issue this 
way: “Put a ruler against a body; it does not say that the body 
is such-and-such a length. Rather is it in itself-I should like 
to say-dead, and achieves nothing of what thought achieves” 
(PI 430). Wittgenstein wants to dispel this idea tha t  it takes 
“thought” as a peculiar medium to enliven our “dead” pictures 
or sentences and tie them to reality. Life is not breathed into 
them, rather they are alive in their use-their use is their life 
(PI 432). And our pictures and sentences “reach right up to re- 
ality” when they are used, not only to describe reality, but also 
to give an order or to express a wish or expectation. 
For Wittgenstein, as we have seen, our pictures and sen- 
tences may meet up with reality in such actions because within 
our pictorial and linguistic practices they constitute methods of 
measurement. It is due to the meaning of “he” and “is coming” 
in the language that “He is coming” expresses a particular ex- 
pectation, so that  “[ilt is in  language that  an  expectation and 
its fulfillment make contact” (PI 445; cf., PI 429, 443-4; PG 55- 
6). Even so, our pictures and sentences cannot meet up with re- 
ality in  these diverse actions unless they are  also applied of 
targets. Only then does the utterance of “he is coming,” or the 
creation or use of a portrait, as a particular act performed in  
the context of certain thoughts and actions and circumstances, 
make contact with a particular person and have a certain con- 
tent (cf., PI 454-457; PG 62). 
If this is so, then a perspicuous overview is needed of what 
makes a representation of a target, and “the whole problem of 
representation” therefore pivots on this question. I have said 
that, for Wittgenstein, of which target a sentence is applied de- 
pends on what i t s  speaker means (meinen) or intends. The 
same, he asserts, holds true of pictures. “The expression of in- 
tention describes the model to be copied; describing the copy 
does not” (PG 58). “An obvious, and correct, answer to the ques- 
tion ‘What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so?’ is that it 
is the intention” (BB p. 32). Likewise: “Image and intention. 
Forming an  image can also be compared to creating a picture in 
this way-namely, I am not imagining whoever is like my im- 
age: no, I am imagining whoever i t  is  I mean to imagine” 
(RPP2 115). 
Let us again restrict our focus to pictures. I have gestured 
at the bond a representation’s application has to someone’s in- 
tention. Beyond this, why does Wittgenstein conclude that “the 
intention” is the “obvious, and correct, answer” to his question? 
To paraphrase PR 20, it is because he believes that  to exclude 
the intention gets wrong the function of pictures and destroys 
the whole logic of pictorial representation. Before turning to his 
conception of the intention, let us  first see why he thinks this 
is so. 
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VI. 
“What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N.? The answer 
which might first suggest itself is: The similarity between the 
portrait and Mr. N” (BB p. 32). I shall label the “Resemblance 
Thesis” this long-standing notion that a picture’s target is sim- 
ply whatever it best resembles. Clearly, Wittgenstein never af- 
firmed th is  thesis. Yet, he raises and  rejects it in  several  
places (e.g., BB p. 32; PG 62; LW1 318; PI p. 177). He faults 
this thesis, not because he finds talk of resemblance incoher- 
ent, but because it makes a mess of the logic of pictorial repre- 
sentation-something he  was a t  pains to clarify in  the  
fiactatus. 
Wittgenstein has found that a picture-token has a discrimi- 
nate content only in  relation to a discriminate target. How- 
ever, the Resemblance Thesis entails that  a picture cannot be 
of just  Napoleon, or just  the Louvre, unless it resembles this 
person or building better than  anything else; and we have 
seen that  what a picture may resemble is far too promiscuous 
to afford any such “unique fit.” But perhaps, as Wittgenstein’s 
interlocutor asserts, this does not hold true for peculiarly men- 
tal images: 
‘The image must be more like the object than any picture. For, 
however like I make the picture to what it is  supposed to repre- 
sent, it can always be the picture of something else as  well. 
But it is  essential to the image that it is  the image of this and 
nothing else.’ Thus one might come to regard the image as  a 
super-likeness. (PI 389) 
Wittgenstein affirms that one may indeed imagine just  King’s 
College on fire, and no other building (BB p. 39). But he de- 
nies tha t  this is so because one’s image manages to uniquely 
resemble King’s College. As Wittgenstein’s interlocutor asks: 
“How do you know that it’s King’s College you imagine on fire? 
Couldn’t i t  be a different building, very much like it? In fact, 
is your imagination so absolutely exact that  there might not 
be a dozen buildings whose representation your image could 
be?” (BB p. 39). 
“Going by the usual criteria of knowledge,” Wittgenstein 
grants tha t  one may indeed know what one imagines (cf., Z 
22). One can say,  and one has no doubts (Z 7). Here, tha t  is, 
“‘know’ means that the expression of uncertainty is senseless” 
(PI 247). But because it entails that  one would have to Zearn 
tha t  one imagines him by means of recognizing him in one’s 
image, the Resemblance Thesis cannot account for this cer- 
tainty.  Wittgenstein remarks: “Of course I was thinking of 
him: I saw him in my mind’s eye!-But I did not recognize him 
by his appearance” (Z 31; RPPl 229). For, first, if one were to 
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come to a judgment about what one imagines on the basis of 
what one recognizes in one’s image, the promiscuity of resem- 
blance would render one’s judgment uncertain. Besides, one 
can imagine someone one has never seen (RPP1 231). Second, 
the Resemblance Thesis errs more fundamentally in assuming 
tha t  one is in  the position of having to ascertain what one 
imagines (LW1 811, 831-5). Even when an  image “just pops 
into one’s head,” one is only under a psychological, not logical, 
“compulsion” to treat  it as an  image of that  which one recog- 
nizes in  it (cf., LW1 316; PI 139-140, p. 177). And when, in  
contrast, one imagines him in the course of thinking about 
him, one “knows” whom one imagines, not because one has  
reasons for being certain (PI 679), but because one does not 
tell this from anything at all. 
Finally, Wittgenstein claims tha t  “it is the essence” of the 
idea of a portrait “that it should make sense to talk of a good 
or bad portrait. In other words it is essential that  [it] should 
be capable of representing things as they are in fact not” (BB 
p. 32). In this respect, he asks whether one could not discover 
that  one imagined someone quite wrongly (LW1 308), and he 
comments that  “I have an  image of N.N. even if my image is 
wrong” (RPP2 82). But the Resemblance Thesis cannot allow 
for either accurate or inaccurate pictorial representation (BB 
p. 32). For a picture P could not rightly or wrongly represent a 
target T unless there could be a difference between what T is 
like and what P represents T as being like; and since the lat- 
t e r  depends on what  P shows, P’s accuracy depends on 
whether P appropriately resembles T. However, if P were not 
to resemble T, or were to better resemble something else, then, 
according to the Resemblance Thesis, T could not be P‘s tar- 
get. 
VII. 
At this point, it may be tempting to call upon causation to 
fix the target, freeing up resemblance to account for what a 
picture shows along with its accuracy. But how exactly might 
causation do the job? Well, i t  appears tha t  a picture’s target 
may often comprise a particular such as Napoleon o r  
Napoleon’s coronation. It also appears that  different tokens of 
the same picture, as a type of structured complex, may have 
different targets. Thus, rather than appeal to with which prop- 
erty instantiations tokens of a picture-type causally covary, it 
may be better to suppose that the target of a picture-token is 
just the particular object that  factors into its causal genesis in 
some particular way. Let us  call this the “Causal Thesis.”13 
While Wittgenstein has little patience with causal theories 
of meaning or intentionality in general, in such places as BB 
pp. 32-3 and PG 57-61 he raises several issues tha t  bear on 
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this Causal Thesis. Now, if one copies a picture from a certain 
object, one’s picture may be causally linked to this object in 
various ways. But, as Wittgenstein notes, even if one tries to 
copy a picture from one object one may do so in order to depict 
another. This suggests that, even when a picture’s target is the 
object copied, it is nonetheless the picture’s application and not 
its causal link t o  an object that  makes it of this object. 
Indeed, a key challenge for the Causal Thesis lies in  ex- 
plaining how one thing’s being caused by another in a certain 
situation makes the other its target. What carries the explana- 
tory weight here  is not t he  idea that smoke “indicates” or 
“means” fire but the idea that the picture’s formation belongs to 
a “process” of copying-where it is natural to think that a par- 
ticular copy is of the particular original from which it is de- 
rived via some process. In that case, what makes something an  
instance of copying? 
What we call “copying something,” Wittgenstein observes 
(BB p. 321, is not a type of physical or mental “process.” Now he 
warns against thinking that  “the essence of copying is the in- 
tention to copy” if this means that the intention is a something 
accompanying particular acts of copying. Yet, he comments that 
“there a re  a great many different processes we call ‘copying 
something’,” and he contends that what makes a particular pro- 
cess P the act of copying is not its similarity to other processes. 
Nor is  P th i s  act  simply because P is  causally linked to a 
viewed object and issues in the production of some structured 
complex: just because one makes a dark line on paper when one 
sees a black dog, it does not follow that one is copying the black 
dog. Rather, just as a particular process is that of putting one’s 
opponent in check only when it belongs to a series of moves in a 
particular game of chess together with all the rules of the game 
(PI 197, 205), so P is an  act of copying only if P belongs to a se- 
ries of acts together with a practice of copying (cf., PI 268). 
Thus, if something functions as a copy insofar as it issues from 
an  act of copying, i t  does not have this function just because it 
is causally linked to an  object in some fashion. 
Granted this, i t  still might be claimed that  a copy’s target 
just  is the object to which the copy is causally linked in  some 
particular way. As Wittgenstein phrases this view, “that a pic- 
ture is a portrait of a particular object consists in its being de- 
rived from that object in a particular way” (BB p. 33). However, 
the derivation of a copy from an  object is again an  intentional 
act, one that one may try to perform and not succeed at (PG 57; 
BB p. 33), and not any particular kind of process or causal link 
to an  object. We may think of this derivation as a kind of pro- 
jection from object to copy, Wittgenstein remarks. But then 
someone may derive a copy from an  object only insofar as she 
conforms to the method of projection, the rule. She could em- 
ploy different methods of projection, moreover, and which is the 
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one she employs does not consist in  what goes on when she 
makes a copy. Indeed, on different interpretations she could be 
construed as projecting her picture from different objects (PG 
57). 
While other avenues could be explored, it does not appear 
that  the Causal Thesis can explain what makes a copy or pic- 
ture of just  this or that target, let alone explain what makes 
something function as a copy of anything. Nor can it do justice 
to what a picture’s target may comprise. For not only may one 
use a picture copied from one object to represent another, one 
may after all make a picture of a possible or fictitious person, 
thing, situation, or event to which no causal links are avail- 
able. Finally, as Wittgenstein stresses from the Philosophical 
Remarks (20-26) onward, since it entails that  one must learn 
what one copies by discovering to which object one’s copy i s  
causally linked, a Causal Thesis can allow for neither one’s 
knowing in advance what one means to copy nor one’s being 
certain about what one copies. 
VIII. 
Let us ignore, for now, a prior intention to make a picture 
of something, as well as what someone other than a picture’s 
creator means it to be of, and let us  suppose tha t  someone, 
Jill, intends a picture she paints to portray Jack. I shall refer 
to this as “Jill’s intention.” If, as Wittgenstein claims, Jill’s 
picture is of just the target she intends, then what is Jill’s in- 
tention if it resides neither in what her picture resembles nor 
in its causal links to an  object? And how can it make her pic- 
ture of Jack? 
When one describes Jill’s intention one is not describing 
what she does as so many physiological goings-on or saying 
that the latter count as certain physical acts (such as painting 
a picture) because they occur in certain circumstances or be- 
cause they have a certain significance in our practices. Nor is 
one describing all this together with the effects caused by Jill’s 
physical acts: the fact tha t  Jill’s painting is of Jack is not a 
physical s ta te  of her  painting, nor is it a “physical event” 
brought about by her bodily movements. I t  is tempting, then, 
to think tha t  one is describing something which causes her  
physical acts. Moreover it is natural to think of Jill’s behavior 
and her painting as inheriting their “life,” their “aboutness,” 
from her intention. I t  may thus be concluded that Jill’s inten- 
tion must be some sort of mental process that  is itself about 
Jack (cf., BB pp. 4-5; 32). And because J i l l  may af ter  a l l  
imagine, portray, speak of, or think of Jack, it may be sup- 
posed that  what “aims” each of these acts at Jack is just  that  
each is caused by a token of the same mental process, an  origi- 
nal and brute germ of “indicating him” (cf., 2 12; PI 689-93). 
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Wittgenstein believes that to view any mental s ta te  as a 
process is not innocuous but “commits us  to a particular way 
of looking at the matter” (PI 3081, and he repeatedly claims 
that  a n  intention is not a process that  accompanies words or 
pictures (LW1 820; PI p. 218). As he puts it: “If God looked 
into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom 
we were speaking o f  (LW1 108; PI p. 217). 
On the one hand, he denies that  an  intention displays the 
“criteria ofidentity” of a mental process, or at least of a “state 
of consciousness.” For whereas the last has the “logical charac- 
teristic” of being interruptible by breaks in consciousness and 
shifts in attention (RPP2 43-50), an  intention does not disap- 
pear when one momentarily attends to a n  itch: an  intermit- 
t en t  intention would not be one interrupted by shifts in  
attention but would be “to have an  intention, to abandon it, to 
resume it, and so on” (Z 47; cf., Z 46, 50). And while conscious 
states have the related logical characteristic of having “genu- 
ine duration,” measurable by a stopwatch, with a beginning, 
middle, and end (RPP2 51), intentions do not (Z 45). Impor- 
tantly, Jill’s saying ”I meant my painting to portray Jack” does 
make “essential reference” to a particular time (cf., RPPl 175- 
7; RPP2 256, 266; PI p. 175). Yet, this report does not express 
the memory of an  experience (RPP2 582; Z 44), but reflects, for 
example, what she would have said at tha t  time where she 
queried (PI 684; RPPl 1134-5). Yes, she might be able to recall 
an  experience, but there could be no way of deriving what she 
intended from this experience with any certainty (RPP2 576). 
Wittgenstein, then, tentatively classifies as “mental disposi- 
tions” the motley of what are called “intentions,” although he 
adds that unlike the disposition to jealousy an  intention is not 
“a disposition in the true sense, inasmuch as one does not per- 
ceive such a disposition within himself as a matter of experi- 
ence” (RPP2 178). 
On the other hand, Wittgenstein argues that no process as 
such can make a representation of a target. As he states in re- 
gard to  meaning a n  utterance of him (LW1 818-21): “Meaning 
[meinen] is  not a process which accompanies words. For no 
‘process’ could have the particular consequences of meaning 
[meinen]” (LW1 820; PI p. 218). First, to state tha t  “Jill in- 
tends Jack” is without point or sense apart  from the circum- 
stance of her performing a particular act (cf., Z 12-28); but no 
process Jill undergoes could have as its consequence, say, that  
Jill portrays someone. Among other things, Jill’s behavior 
could not count as such an act unless there were in place pruc- 
tices of making pictures, of applying them of targets, or of us- 
ing them to  represent how something is and of doing so by 
virtue of how the  picture appears  (cf., PI 205). Only then  
would Jill’s applying paint to a canvas have the significance of 
painting a picture. More importantly, only when she is trained 
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into these practices could her behavior have certain normative 
consequences and count as the act of representing something 
or of portraying someone; where her painting is supposed to 
be of a particular person and  is supposed to depict th i s  
person’s appearance, mood, or disposition; where the picture’s 
observer is meant to become acquainted with this person’s ap- 
pearance and so on; where her painting may be judged good 
or bad, accurate or inaccurate, on a variety of criteria, includ- 
ing whether it captures his appearance, and so forth (cf., PI 
Second, Wittgenstein contends tha t  no process tha t  Jill 
may undergo could have the consequence that  her painting is 
supposed to be of Jack. Here, I can only provide a summary of 
his main reasons. Jill may, of course, focus her attention on 
Jack while she paints his portrait. But her attending to Jack, 
he claims, may consist in a variety of different processes and 
there is no one characteristic process that occurs whenever 
she does so (PI 35). Attending to Jack, besides, is a n  inten- 
tional act, and a process-token counts as such an  act only be- 
cause it is located in  a series of acts and because it has a 
certain standing in a set of practices (PI 33). Furthermore, no 
process in Jill’s head could so much as count as a ”sign” which 
functions to designate something, he argues in his so-called 
“private sensation language argument,” unless there were in  
place practices of designating objects together with their in- 
cumbent ramifications. Jack is a person, moreover, the par- 
ticular person who is so-and-so. But Wittgenstein also argues 
that such a being could neither satisfy nor fail to satisfy this 
sign apart from a scaffolding of language-games wherein par- 
ticulars and types of things are identified and discriminated, 
or described and referred to (PI  28-35, 257-261). Still, it 
might be thought tha t  the mental mechanism tokening this 
sign either represents or “realizes” in its structure an  “inten- 
sion,” a rule determining this sign’s application. However, as 
Wittgenstein stresses in  his remarks on following a rule, a 
rule is no mere process but expresses what it is to proceed 
correctly; it is something tha t  may be conformed to or uio- 
luted. There could be no rule for the correct application of a 
sign, moreover, unless there were a custom or regular use of 
going on with this sign. Thus, whatever Jill might “represent” 
in her mind, it could function as the representation of such a 
rule, and function as a “signpost” guiding her correctly going 
on, only within this practice (PI 197-202). Likewise, whatever 
the mental mechanism tokening this sign might “realize” in  
its structure, if it could malfunction then the criterion for the 
sign’s correct application could not be strictly with what its 
tokening happens to “correspond.” The criterion for whether 
something is the right sum of an  addition is not whether it is 
the sum tha t  someone happens to produce; rather the crite- 
692-3). 
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rion for whether someone correctly adds a sum is whether the 
action performed conforms to the rule (cf., PG 56; PI 689-93). 
Ix. 
If i t  i s  not a “dead” process she undergoes, i t  might be 
tempting to conclude that  Jill’s intention is a “living” act she 
performs from within diverse human and social practices, one 
comprising the formation or use of a (mental) representation 
whose ta rge t  is Jack  or which expresses t h a t  Jack  is her  
painting’s target. 
Wittgenstein also denies that  the intention has the logical 
characteristics of an act (PI 693). To intend a picture of him is 
not the same as to think about him (PI 692; LW1 821). The 
fundamental error, he insists, is to think that the intention 
“consists in” anything which could qualify as either “articu- 
lated” or “non-articulated” (Z 16; PI p. 217; contrast PR 69- 
70). Naturally, Jill may imagine, think about, or speak of Jack, 
before or during or after she paints his portrait (cf., RPPl 
238). But such accompanying acts are on a par with her act of 
creating Jack’s portrait, and they do not constitute her inten- 
tion. After all,  one cannot reliably infer t h a t  Jill has  per- 
formed any such act simply from the fact that  she intends her 
painting to portray Jack (Z 21). Nor is it correct to think that  
Jill intends her picture to portray Jack by means of one of a 
family of more “basic” actions in the way that one can turn on 
a light by flipping a switch or by pushing a button (Z 26). “It is 
wrong to say: I meant him by looking at him. ‘Meaning’ does 
not stand for an  activity which wholly or partly consists in the 
‘utterances’ of meaning” (Z 19). For, unlike the command to 
calculate a sum, the command to intend a painting to portray 
so-and-so does not command one to do anything at all (Z 51). 
In order to obey the latter command, one must bring oneself 
into this condition (Z 52), say by imagining a situation and a 
history to fit this intention (Z 9). 
Still, all this will be readily rebutted as long as one holds 
that Jill’s intention must consist either in her mentally repre- 
senting Jack or in  her  applying her picture conformably to 
what this act sets out as her picture’s target. Wittgenstein’s 
response is that  this “must” produces a vicious regress (cf., BB 
pp. 33-4). For what would make the mental representation of 
Jack? If i t  is not of Jack “inherently” then, according to this 
“must,” its being meant of Jack has to consist in, say, her ap- 
plying it conformably to what a second mental representation 
lays out as its target, and so on. And Wittgenstein has main- 
tained tha t  no mental act  is any more “inherently” of Jack 
than is a n  act of painting a portrait. That is, he has argued 
both that the target of a mental image is fixed neither by what 
it resembles nor by its causal links, and that the target of a 
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sentence is not determined simply by the sense or reference of 
its terms in a language but depends on the utterer’s inten- 
tion-on her circumstances, beliefs, thoughts, and  action^.'^ 
According to Wittgenstein, then, by itself no accompanying 
representation has the consequence that another representa- 
tion is of a certain target. If Jill is already painting Jack’s por- 
trait  then her painting is already of him, and an  
accompanying act of imagining or  speaking of Jack does not 
make her picture his portrait (RPP1 183; PI 683-4). It is in- 
stead a sign of which target she means her picture (LW1 818). 
As Wittgenstein writes in regard to  meaning a sentence of 
him: 
Instead of ‘I meant him’ one may also say ‘I was speaking of 
him.’ And how does one do that, how does one speak of him in 
speaking those words? Why does i t  sound wrong to say ‘I spoke 
of him by pointing to him as  I spoke those words)? 
‘To mean him’ means, say, ‘to talk of him.’ Not: to point to him. 
And if I talk of him, of course there is a connexion between my 
talk and him, but this connexion resides in the application of 
the talk, not in the act of pointing. Pointing is itself only a 
sign, and in the language-game it may direct the application of 
the sentence, and so shew what is meant. (Z 24) 
Now Jill may first imagine someone and then paint the person 
she imagines (RPP2 82)) so that what she imagines “makes” 
her painting of this person (LW1 311). But this is so because 
she applies the painting she later creates of the person she 
imagined earlier. She could apply it otherwise, and her so ap- 
plying it does not itself consist in an act of representing any- 
thing. For suppose tha t  she also says t o  herself tha t  she 
intends to  paint a portrait of the person she has just imag- 
ined, namely Jack, and that she thereby forms the intention to 
paint Jack’s portrait. Again, this makes the painting she pro- 
duces into Jack’s portrait only if she later applies her painting 
conformably to  the intention she formed by means of these 
words. And, on pain of vicious regress, it had better not be the 
case that her so applying her painting must require her to say, 
in addition, that her painting is supposed to  be about just the 
person that she has intended to portray. 
X. 
The question “What is Jill’s intention?” has turned out to be 
misleading. It immediately inclines one to search out the in- 
tention in something occurring alongside her painting or act of 
creating it. It is better t o  ask this: What does one describe 
when one describes Jill’s intention? Wittgenstein comments: 
“Describing an intention means describing what went on from 
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a particular point of view, with a particular purpose. I paint a 
particular portrait  of what went on” (Z 23). One might de- 
scribe whom Jill meant her painting to portray in order to re- 
veal something about her, or to render intelligible her further 
behavior (PI 654-9). More directly, one’s purpose is to specify, 
not what ran through her mind, or what “caused” her painting 
to be about Jack, but simply to which target she applies her 
painting; and Wittgenstein compares the point of doing so to 
the point of describing something’s function (PR 31; PG 95; Z 
48). To say that a brake is meant to stop the car is to describe, 
not what it does do (since it may malfunction) or can do (since 
it may have all sorts of additional capacities), but its function 
in  the system of the car, given the car’s uses. In turn,  to de- 
scribe the brake’s function is to state what it is supposed to do 
so that,  for example, one knows tha t  it malfunctions when it 
does not stop the car. Similarly, to say what Jill’s painting is 
meant to portray is to describe, not what i t  does resemble or 
what it could accurately represent, but which target it func- 
tions to be of in some system. And to describe this function is 
to state what her painting is supposed to represent so that, for 
example, one knows whom it portrays as looking a certain 
way, or that it is inaccurate if it misrepresents this target. 
But if what one describes when one describes Jill’s inten- 
tion is what her painting functions to portray, then on what 
basis does Jill’s painting function to portray Jack? Something 
functions as a brake due to the role it plays in the system of a 
car. But clearly, on Wittgenstein’s account, Jill’s painting can- 
not have this function due to the role a picture of its type of 
appearance plays in a system of pictures. A better example, I 
think, is  the position of a needle on a car’s fuel gauge. Pro- 
vided its role in the system of a car and the car’s use, a car’s 
fuel gauge has the function of representing the level of fuel in 
the gas tank. It is due to this function that the needle’s being 
on ‘F” functions to represent that  the gas tank is full. Given a 
different function of th i s  gauge in  a different system, the  
needle’s location on ‘F’ would function to represent something 
else. This example, then, suggests tha t  Jill’s painting func- 
tions to portray Jack due to the function of that which em- 
ploys this painting. 
So what employs Jill’s painting? The answer, quite simply, 
is a being who performs a particular act at some time and in 
some context. Jill’s painting functions to be of Jack, tha t  is, 
because what she does functions as the act of painting Jack’s 
portrait. There is after all a “logical” link between Jill’s inten- 
tion and what she does: it is true that  Jill means the picture 
she paints to portray Jack if and only if it  is true that Jill per- 
forms the act of painting Jack’s portrait. It is not that  Jill’s in- 
tention is this act, or any other act accompanying it. Rather, 
to describe Jill’s intention is to describe a particular sort of 
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function of what she does. In this regard, Wittgenstein often 
mentions diverse acts that  are of a person N and wherein one 
makes or uses a gesture or image or picture or words: one 
might command N to come by means of saying “Come here” or 
by means of making a hand gesture, speak or talk of N, make 
a remark with an  allusion to N, say that N is over there while 
pointing, think about N, imagine N, write a letter to N, curse 
N, or paint  N’s portrait  (Z 21-32; PI 680-5). Here, as 
Wittgenstein sees it,  the gesture or image or picture or sen- 
tence is of N, not because this is their function in a system of 
gestures and so forth, but because the act functions to be of N 
(cf., LW1 318). When queried, therefore, one may answer “I 
was speaking of N” in place of “I meant N” (Z 24; PI 687). If 
one does say “I meant N,” one is describing not what one did, 
or anything accompanying what one did, but a certain function 
of what one did-what one’s act counted as being of-a func- 
tion that other acts could have (cf., PI 680; Z 25).15 
If this is so, then what makes a n  act of forming or using 
a representation count as being of a certain target?  
Wittgenstein, unfortunately, provides only the germ of a n  an- 
swer in  such comments as these: “What connects my words 
with him? The situation and my thoughts. And my thoughts in 
just  the same way as the things I say out loud” (Z 9). “What 
makes this sentence a sentence that has to do with him? The 
fact tha t  we were speaking about him.-And what makes a 
conversation a conversation about him?-Certain transitions 
we make or would make” (LWI 318). Such remarks suggest 
tha t  what makes Jill’s behavior count as the act of creating 
Jack’s portrait  is t h a t  it is performed within a par t icular  
stream of thoughts, acts, a n d  events (provided her participa- 
tion in a host of social and human practices). I t  could be that  
Jack asked Jill to paint his portrait, Jill decided to accept his 
commission and intended to paint his portrait, she used Jack 
as her model, she corrected her painting so that  it better ap- 
proximated his appearance or better captured his mood, and 
later gave it to Jack in  exchange for money (cf., BB p. 32). 
Likewise, what makes a n  image a n  image of him is the par- 
ticular “path on which it lies” (PG 99). An image may be of the 
streets of one’s town because one may have formed this image 
while attempting to figure out the best route from one’s house 
to the grocery store. In general, therefore, Wittgenstein claims 
that  what makes a representation of a target is the fact tha t  
its creation or use has  a particular location in  a system of 
transitions comprising the antecedent situation and history, 
the present circumstances, and what follows (Z 7, 9, 14, 26, 28; 
BB p. 39; PG 99; RPPl230,240). 
This  is why, if there is some question about what  Jill 
means h e r  painting to  portray, we must  ask her-and he r  
truthful answer would be decisive (LW1 813-8; PI p. 177). It is 
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not that  Jill’s answer is decisive because she can infallibly as- 
certain her intention whereas we can only guess. Indeed, were 
she to t ry  to do so, her  judgment could be quite uncertain 
since nothing in the surrounding circumstances might tie up 
to her  painting’s target unconditionally (Z 41; R P P l  230). 
Rather, her answer may be decisive because it functions to es- 
tablish a connection of her painting to Jack. Or, it  may be de- 
cisive because she has performed the  act of painting Jack’s 
portrait and because she has done so in a particular situation 
of which she is intimately aware. As Wittgenstein remarks in 
regard to a related topic: 
At the question ‘Why don’t I infer my probable actions from my 
talk? one might say that it is like this: as an official in a ministry 
I don’t infer the ministry’s probable decisions from the official ut- 
terances, since of course I am acquainted with the source, the gen- 
esis of these utterances and of the decisions .... (RPP 1 711) 
XI. 
Has Wittgenstein answered his question? Has he explained 
what makes a picture or image or thought or sentence of him? 
While his  investigations do offer a perspicuous answer, 
they may be seen as raising a number of issues, not all  of 
which Wittgenstein has himself pursued in any detail. In par- 
ticular, there is the matter of just  how an  act’s location in a 
series of thoughts, acts, and circumstances is supposed to 
make it count as the act of representing a certain target. 
But even if he were to have taken his investigations fur- 
ther  in  such a direction, he still would not have stated jus t  
which conditions a re  necessary and sufficient in  order for a 
representation to be of a particular target. For Wittgenstein, 
however, this is as should be. Exactitude is after all relative to 
one’s aim, and Wittgenstein’s goal has been to provide a per- 
spicuous overview of representation and intention in order to 
untangle various philosophical snarls. Further, he doubts that  
a more precise general explanation is to be had (RPP1 257) in- 
asmuch as he denies that a picture may function to be of Jack 
if and only if its formation or use occurs in the context of just 
such-and-such thoughts and actions and circumstances (Z 26). 
If this is so then the attempt at a “clearer” statement of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions will likely be motivated by, 
or produce, false “musts.” Wittgenstein freely allows, for ex- 
ample, that  Jill may have formed the prior intention to paint 
Jack’s portrait. But we err, he believes, once we suppose that  
her  act  of painting Jack’s portrait must result  from such a 
prior intention; and in respect to this “must” he often stresses 
that the link of picture to target might be forged only in what 
follows (Z 7, 14, 27). 
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Nor does Wittgenstein forward a reductive explanation of 
the intention. Not only does he make no pretense at “analyz- 
ing” Jill’s act of creating Jack’s portrait as just  the “process” 
with these or those causal inputs or outputs, everything indi- 
cates t ha t  he would t rea t  such a n  “analysis” as hopelessly 
wrongheaded. Clearly, moreover, he assumes tha t  Jill’s cre- 
ation of a picture is the act of painting Jack’s portrait just  be- 
cause it belongs to a particular series of thoughts and acts 
that  are themselves about diverse targets. “The connection be- 
tween the portrait of N and N himself,” Wittgenstein observes, 
could (but need not! (PG 99)) reside in the fact “that the name 
written underneath is the name used to address him” (PG 62). 
But the act of tacking a name onto a picture can either make 
it the portrait of N or report that it is Ns portrait only if there 
is already a link in place between this sign and N, and only if 
this name has the appropriate application in this situation. Fi- 
nally, he has argued that Jill’s act of painting a picture (or her 
surrounding thoughts and acts) could not count as being of 
Jack, or as representing what he is like, apar t  from a rich 
scaffolding of human and social practices together with the 
form of life in which they inhere. 
Jerry Fodor writes: “It’s hard to see ... how one can be a 
Realist about intentionality without being, to some extent or 
other, a Reductionist .... If aboutness is real, it must really be 
something else.”I6 Disregarding the misreading of Wittgenstein 
as a behaviorist, what may give rise to the suspicion that  he 
denies the “reality” of the intention is precisely that he has no 
interest  i n  reducing it to  something presumed, on some a 
priori basis, to be “more real”-whether a mental or physical 
process, or a relation of resemblance or causation. This reflects 
Wittgenstein’s general (though rather nuanced) forswearing of 
“explanation” in favor of “describing the phenomena.” But, in 
the  case of intentionality, this  bespeaks something else as 
well: 
An explanation of the operation of language as a psychophysical 
mechanism is of no interest to us. Such an explanation itself 
uses language to describe phenomena (association, memory etc); 
it is itself a linguistic act and stands outside the calculus; but 
we need an explanation which is part of the calculus. (PG 33) 
A reductionist’s explanation of the intention is itself an  inten- 
tional act employing language meant of a target. The reduc- 
tionist is thus  in  danger of defeating herself when the  
consequence of her explanation is to obscure the significance 
and normative standing of her act. She is also in danger of ex- 
changing the living explanadurn of intentionality for a dead 
phenomenon. Wittgenstein observes tha t  when viewed from 
the “outside,” in  “isolation” from its surroundings, a picture 
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appears “dead”: “It does not point outside itself to a reality be- 
yond” (PG 100). Yet, if the actions and context surrounding 
someone’s creation or use of a picture or image are also viewed 
from the outside, as “processes” of diverse causal relations, as 
under the reductionist’s gaze, then they too appear as dead 
(PG 100). A living explanation of intentionality, he believes, 
can only hope to elucidate it from within rather than pretend 
to explain it from without. 
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l The following are Ludwig Wittgenstein’s texts that I will refer to 
by abbreviation. All numbers refer to remark number unless preceded 
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Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees, ed., A. Kenny, trans. (Oxford: 
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R. Rhees, eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. (New York: Macmillan 
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Philosophical Remarks, R. Rhees, ed., R. Hargreaves and R. 
White, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975). 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, G. E. M. 
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 11, G. H. von 
Wright and H. Nyman, eds., C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, 
trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
Ductatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. F. Pears, trans. (London: 
McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961). 
Zettel, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds., G. E. M. 
Anscombe. trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1967). 
For other discussions of Wittgenstein’s views on this topic see, for 
example, P. M. S. Hacker, “The Agreement of Thought and Reality,” in 
Wittgenstein’s Intentions, J. Canfield and S. Shanker, eds. (New York 
and London: Garland Publishing, 1993), 38-50; and Malcolm Budd, 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989), 125-145. 
This is not to say that there are no important differences between 
mental images and physical pictures or that Wittgenstein does not re- 
sist identifying the two. In RPPB 63 he states: “Images are not pictures. 
I do not tell what object I am imagining by the resemblance between it 
and the image.” It is hard to tell whether the second sentence is meant 
as the reason for the first. I t  would be a bad one since he also denies 
that one ascertains what a picture one makes is about by what it re- 
sembles (RPP2 115; cf. PG 62; BB p. 32). A better reason would be that 
mental images are not enduring objects that  are repeatedly viewable 
and from multiple perspectives by a homunculus (cf., RPP2 63-144). 
Even so, Wittgenstein draws a parallel between imagining something on 
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will and creating a picture of something (RPP2 1151, and between hav- 
ing an image pop into one’s head and seeing a picture (PI p. 177; LW1 
316). He also assumes that an image, like a picture, may be of him, 
represent that he looks a certain way, and indeed “look like” him. One 
may reveal the look of an image that pops into one’s head by means of a 
picture, even though one may not know what this image is about or 
from what it is derived (RPP2 63; LW1 316). 
In BB p. 37, while attempting to dispel the notion tha t  a 
proposition’s sense is a “shadow” or “picture” alongside the proposition, 
Wittgenstein further marks off “copies” or “pictures by similarity” from 
other pictures. “Copies are good pictures when they can be easily mis- 
taken for what they represent.” In contrast, an accurate plane projection 
of one hemisphere of the terrestrial globe is not a “copy” insofar as  it 
does not look like its target. 
This use of the term “target” is largely indebted to Robert 
Cummins, Representations, Targets, and Attitude, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1996). Wittgenstein, of course, does not use the terms “tar- 
get” or “content” in these ways, and while he certainly speaks of what a 
picture we shall see that his views on what a picture can show 
alter over time. Nonetheless, I believe that this schema will be of con- 
siderable aid in understanding his conception of the logic of pictorial 
representation. 
I should say why I choose to use the term “content” rather than 
“sense” to refer to what a representation represents a target as being. 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein speaks of a picture’s or proposition’s 
“sense” (Sinn), and his views there allow little discrimination between a 
picture’s or proposition’s sense and what I call its content. Matters are 
rather different in his later philosophy. Here, he very rarely speaks of a 
picture’s “sense” and, as we shall see, he ties talk of a “proposition’s 
sense” to what a type of proposition means in the language rather than 
to what someone is, say, asserting by means of this proposition in some 
particular context and time. 
I should also mention that my distinction between a picture’s “target” 
and what it “shows” is similar to Nelson Goodman’s distinction between 
“a picture of a black horse” and “a black-horse picture” (see Languages 
ofArt [Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 19681), while my dis- 
tinction of “target” and “content” is not unlike Fred Dretske’s distinction 
between a picture’s “topic” and its “comment” (see Explaining Behavior 
[Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19881, 70-1). However, Goodman speaks 
of what a picture is of as its “denotation,” and Dretske speaks of a 
picture’s “topic” as  its “reference.” I find this rather misleading, espe- 
cially when a similar distinction is drawn in regard to linguistic utter- 
ances. For, as I shall later suggest, to speak of a linguistic utterance’s 
target is not the same to speak of the “reference” of a sign in the lan- 
For discussions of the Ductatus’ views on especially how the corre- 
lation of a proposition’s names to simple objects is made see the follow- 
ing: Steve Gerrard, “Two Ways of Grounding Meaning,” Philosophical 
Investigations 14 ( 2 )  1991: 95-114; Richard McDonough, “The Philo- 
sophical Psychologism of the Tractatus,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 
31 (4) 1993: 425-447. 
These methods of division are tied to our interests, needs, and 
aims. But that does not mean, as Wittgenstein observes in RPP145-49 
and PI p. 230, that “general facts of nature” may not make one method 
guy!. 
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of dividing things up, relative to our interests, needs, and aims, appear 
“natural” (but not “necessary”). And though it would not follow that we 
would employ different methods of division were these general facts 
other than what they are, or that our current methods would become in- 
coherent, our current methods could become useless. 
As I am reading his “remarks on following a rule” in PI 138-242 
and elsewhere, therefore, Wittgenstein’s goal is not to raise “skeptical 
doubts” concerning the possibility of rules (although, as  he admits, his 
remarks may have this appearance), but is to dispel a mistaken view of 
their nature and ground as well as provide a perspicuous representation 
of both. See, in contrast, Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Pri- 
vate Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
Oddly, the Dactatus granted that the same schematic drawing of 
a cube may be at  once isomorphic to two different possible situations in 
reality-to a cube with this face in the fore, and to a cube with that face 
in the fore (TLP 5.5423). Yet, i t  did not proceed to ask: “So which of 
these does it represent as  being the case in reality?” 
lo According to Wittgenstein in PR pp. 301-3, and again in PG pp. 
199-201 (see also BB p. 31), a house is a “complex” whereas “that I am 
tired” is a ”fact.” Complexes may move, facts do not. Complexes are 
spatial objects, facts are not. Complexes, but not facts, can be literally 
pointed at. Complexes are wholes composed of parts, facts are not. And 
while it is a fact that a complex is composed of such-and-such parts ar- 
ranged in such-and-such ways, a complex is not composed of its parts 
and their relations. However, it is unclear both whether Wittgenstein 
takes all this to contradict the Ductatus, and whether the Tractatus 
does confuse facts and complexes (see, for example, Anthony Kenny, 
“The Ghost of the Tractatus,” in Understanding Wittgenstein, G. Vesey, 
ed. [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 19741, 1-13). It strikes that 
me that the Ductatus does assume a distinction between fact and com- 
plex when, for instance, it construes a fact (Tatsache), not as a state of 
affairs (Sachverhalt) tout court, but as the existence (or nonexistence) of 
a state of affairs (2). It also strikes me that the Dactatus implicitly ac- 
knowledges the point I am making in this paragraph when it writes “A 
proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it 
is true” and adds that it “says that they do so stand” (4.022). If this is 
the case, then the Dactatus may be said to allow a distinction between 
what a picture “shows,” a possible state of affairs, and its “content,” 
which fact (or facts) it represents as being the case in reality. 
l1 Of course, in order for there to be pictorial misrepresentation i t  
had better not be the case that  one is constrained to so interpret a 
picture’s content that  i t  turns  out to represent its target correctly. 
While I do not believe that one is so constrained on Wittgenstein’s ac- 
count, I will not try to pursue this complex issue here. 
l2 In this respect, Wittgenstein often dwells on phenomena that  
heighten the potential dissonance between a word’s meaning 
(Bedeutung) in the language and what a speaker means (meinen) by it, 
as for instance when one makes a special code language from everyday 
words, or when one plays the game of meaning a word such as “bank” 
with now this meaning, now with that. Similarly, he explores the im- 
port of someone’s being incapable of saying with which meaning she 
means a word in some context, or of playing the game of meaning a 
word with now this meaning, now that, outside any particular context 
(cf., RPPl 175-250, passim; PI pp. 214-216). 
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Is I need stress that the “Causal Thesis” at issue here concerns what 
fixes a representation’s target and thus differs in aim from the various, 
currently popular, “causal theories of meaning.” In general, the latter 
largely seek to explain the ground of the semantics of the predicate ex- 
pressions of a “language of thought”-how tokens of a predicate-type 
“mean” the instantiations of a certain property, irrespective of the time 
or context of their tokening. Jerry Fodor, in A Theory of Content and 
Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19901, for example, pro- 
poses that  tokens of the language of thought symbol “dog” denote dog 
instantiations because there is a nomic causal covariance between dogs 
and the property that causes a cognitive system to token “dog“ when it 
is about the business of detecting what is present in its sensory environ- 
ment, where any non-dog-to-“dog“ causal link would be “asymmetrically 
dependent” on the dog-to-”dog“ causal link. Such a theory is inherently 
ill-suited as an account of a representation’s target if, as Wittgenstein 
supposes, different tokens of the same representation-type may have 
different targets in different times and contexts. 
l4 Thus, even if a person were to possess an  innately understood 
“language of thought” whose terms have “inherent meaning,” as some 
are want to speculate (see Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought [Cam- 
bridge: Harvard University Press, 19751), it would not follow that any 
sentence-token in this language is inherently of a target. 
Like Wittgenstein, Robert Cummins (see, Representations, Targets, 
and Attitudes [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19961) holds that a repre- 
sentation-token functions to be of a target in virtue of what tokens it. 
However, Cummins discussion of representations and their targets oc- 
curs in the context of contemporary cognitive science, and in this con- 
text his view is roughly that what makes t the target of a token of a 
mental representation r is that r is tokened by a cognitive mechanism 
or system whose functional role in the mental economy is to represent t .  
l6 Jerry Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Phi- 
losophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 97. 
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